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abStract
stakeholder conflicts in relation to forest decentralization policies were studied in West kalimantan, 
indonesia to determine:
• how these policies were understood by local stakeholders, 
• how they were implemented, and 
• their impacts in terms of forest management and conflicts. 
a case study using qualitative methodologies i.e. semi-structured interviews, field observations 
and workshops, was made. the results show that the implementation of decentralization policies 
gave rise to conflicts between local and central government as well as among local stakeholders. 
despite the goal of benefiting local stakeholders by decentralizing forest management, the central 
government’s subsequent withdrawal of much of the local governments’ authority to manage 
forestry raises new questions on whether the central government is indeed willing to share power. 
We concluded that central and local governments and relevant stakeholders need to develop better 
communication and negotiation procedures to address current conflicts appropriately.
Key words: conflict management, negotiations
introduction
natural resource management (nrm) is almost always characterized by conflict. 
many authors have argued that conflict is unavoidable particularly because 
stakeholders have differing and competing interests, perceptions and ideas about 
how nrm should be carried out (e.g., Buckles 1999, castro and nielson 2003). 
there is a large body of literature that deals with nrm conflicts and covers areas 
such as forestry (e.g., matose, 1997, fao, 2000, hellstrom, 2001, schroeder-
Wildberg and carius, 2003, Yasmi, 2003, Wulan et al., 2004), fishery (e.g., 
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Bavinck, 1998, Jentoft 2000), and land use (e.g., mardiros, 1997, Valladares-
Padua et al., 2002). Because nrm conflicts are so ubiquitous and regular, 
conflict and conflict management has become a key and inseparable aspect of 
nrm. a variety of consequences of nrm conflicts have been noted including 
distrust among stakeholders, resource degradation, hostility etc. however, to 
a limited extent, conflicts have also had positive outcomes: for instance, new 
agreements over resource management, policy changes and co-management 
agreements among stakeholders (castro and nielson, 2001).
there has been a long debate about whether conflict is a positive or negative 
social phenomenon. one school puts forward a “functionalist” or “harmonic” 
idea and perceives conflict as a mess or hindrance, something dysfunctional 
and entirely bad (Bailey, 1997). in other words, this school of thought often 
associates conflict with threat to the status quo. Proponents of this school of 
thought argue, in particular, that conflict connotes a disruption of reliable and 
stable conditions (kriesberg, 1998). as a consequence, the negative perception 
of conflict gives rise to conflict avoidance, repression or elimination approaches. 
others argue that though conflicts may result in dysfunctional situations, they 
may also offer constructive outcomes (castro and nielson, 2001). this school of 
thought interprets social conflicts as valuable ties that hold modern democratic 
societies together and provide them with the cohesion they need (hirschman 
1994); accordingly, conflict contributes to desirable positive changes if it is 
managed and addressed appropriately.
many authors now contend that conflict has both positive and negative 
potential (Bailey, 1997, Walker and daniels 1997, kriesberg 1998). according 
to this emerging view, an important factor that influences the positive or 
negative outcomes of a particular conflict is conflict management. in this 
regard, the success or failure of conflict management is determined mainly by 
the development of adequate conflict capabilities, i.e., the ability to anticipate 
and deal with conflict constructively so that the positive potential is enhanced 
and the negative potential is eliminated. one of the main prerequisites for the 
development of such capabilities is a solid understanding of conflict triggers or 
the fundamental issues that lead to conflict (Glasl, 1999).
nrm conflicts do not occur in a vacuum: they are embedded in a specific 
social setting and policy context. some nrm conflicts take place at local 
level over boundary issues or access to a particular area such as farmland or 
forest. other nrm conflicts involve wider issues and stakeholders. for instance, 
conflicts might take place between local and national actors over specific policy 
issues such as decentralization. 
in this paper we discuss forest-related conflicts among various stakeholders 
involved in forest management in West kalimantan, indonesia, within the context 
of decentralized forest management policies. We describe the implementation 
of ‘small logging permits’ (known locally as ‘100-ha concessions’); this type 
of concession was very popular because under decentralization policies district 
governments had the authority to issue permits for them. Before discussing 
various conflicts that have arisen in the implementation of these ‘small logging 
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permits’, we describe how forest management changed under decentralization 
policies and the impact that these changes had on local economies and, 
subsequently, stakeholder conflicts. the results described in this study cover the 
early stages of decentralization in indonesia (i.e., from 1999 to 2003).
forestry in indonesia: from ‘centralistic’ to decentralized management
forests are one of the most important natural resources in indonesia. this is not 
only because forestry makes a major contribution to the national economy but also 
because it has great socio-cultural and ecological importance. the exploitation 
of indonesia’s forests did not begin until the late 1960s when it became the 
means of boosting economic development. in 1967, the Government of indonesia 
enacted the Basic forestry law to regulate forest exploitation. moreover, in the 
same year, to attract investment in forestry and other productive sectors such 
as mining and oil exploitation, the government ratified a regulation on foreign 
investment. the Government of indonesia granted 35-year concession rights to 
private and state-owned companies to extract timber from indonesia’s rich natural 
forests. concession holders are permitted to harvest trees in designated areas as 
guided by the Indonesian Selective Cutting System (armitage and kuswanda 
1989).
since then, the forestry sector has expanded rapidly, and by 1993 the total 
number of concession holders in the country had risen to 580, with concessions 
covering an area of 61 million ha (mof, 2004); the timber-related industries 
saw similar growth. By 1993/1994 indonesia had the largest market share of 
tropical plywood exports with an annual revenue estimated at us$ 3.5 billion 
(Barr, 2001). other earnings from exports of logs, sawn-wood, wood working 
and furniture also generated billions of dollars in revenue.
during the second half of the 1990s, environmentalists and the international 
community increased their pressure on the Government of indonesia because 
the natural forests were being exploited so rapidly. moreover, by this time the 
remaining forests had become much harder to access because of the difficult 
topography. as a result, the forestry sector steadily declined. the number of 
concession holders decreased to 387 in 1999 and to 267 in 2003, with area of 
28 million ha under concession (mof, 2004). furthermore, the end of the 1990s 
was also marked by a political transformation following the demise of President 
soeharto’s authoritarian regime, which had been in power for 32 years. With 
the fall of soeharto in 1998, major shifts in political structure took place that 
affected all sectors, including forestry.
the first shift was marked by the enactment of law 22 on regional 
autonomy and law 25 on fiscal Balancing in 1999. these two laws formed the 
foundations of indonesian decentralization policies. moreover, in 1999 the Basic 
forestry law was also replaced by a new forestry law known as law 41. most 
stakeholders in the country, particularly those who had long awaited change, 
applauded the enactment of these three new laws. nevertheless, many questions 
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remained as to how to implement this legislation on the ground, particularly in 
view of the fact that lower-level rulings for the technical implementation of these 
laws did not exist at that time. as a result, disagreement and confusion occurred 
among stakeholders at lower levels of government as to who had authority for 
determining forest areas, utilizing forest products, issuing permits for forest-
product extraction, and collecting taxes or fees on forest products (mccarthy 
2004). 
amidst this confusion, later in the same year the government published 
a regulation2  and two decrees3  that gave authority to district governments to 
issue ‘small logging permits’. in response to this, local governments throughout 
indonesia started to grant two types of small logging permit, namely the 
timber Product utilization Permit (known as iuPhhk) and the forest Product 
harvesting Permit (known as hPhh). the first type of permit could be granted 
to cooperatives, small to medium-scale businesses and state-owned or privately 
owned enterprises, with a maximum size of 50,000 ha per permit. in sintang 
district, where this study took place, eight iuPhhk permits covering a total 
area of more than 200,000 ha were issued to private logging companies between 
2001 and 2003 (table 1).
the second type of permit (hPhh), on the other hand, could be issued to 
individuals, farmer groups and cooperatives, with a maximum area of 100 ha per 
permit. these permits were popular, and were often called ‘100-ha concessions’: 
district governments in West kalimantan issued more than 900 hPhh permits 
between 2000 and 2002 (dinas kehutanan kalimantan Barat 2004). in sintang 
district 464 permits were awarded to various farmer groups and local cooperatives 
– more than in any other district in West kalimantan (table 2). 
taBle 1
iuPhhk permits issued by sintang district Government
no name of company area (ha) Validity
1 Pt. Borneo karunia mandiri 12,000 2003–2028
2 Pt. sinergi Bumi lestari 16,900 2001–2026
3 Pt. safir kencana raharja 36,400 2001–2026
4 Pt. lintas ketungau Jaya 50,000 2003–2028
5 koperasi apang semangai 16,500 2002–2027
6 Pt. rimba kapuas lestari 41,090 2002–2027
7 Pt. insan kapuas 34,000 2002–2027
8 Pt. hutan Persada lestari 13,500 2002–2027
 total 220,390
2regulation no. 6/1999 on forest utilization and forest Product harvesting in Production forests. 
3decree of minister of forestry no. 310/kpts-ii/1999 on Guidelines for Granting forest Product 
harvesting. rights and no.05.1/kpts-ii/2000 on the criteria and standards for forest Product utilization 
and harvesting Business licences. 
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research location and stakeholders
this study forms part of research on decentralization and its impacts on forestry 
and livelihoods in indonesia carried out by the center for international forestry 
research (cifor) since 20024 . the study site is located in sintang district5 , 
West kalimantan, which is bordered by sarawak, malaysia, to the north (figure 
1). West kalimantan is about 14.7 million ha in area; some 3.8 million ha are 
classified as protection forest, while 5 million ha are designated for timber 
production (Pemerintah Propinsi kalimantan Barat, 1995, dinas kehutanan 
kalimantan Barat, 2004). the southern part of sintang district is said to be the 
last frontier of conservation forest in the province because three national parks 
are situated there, namely Betung karihun, danau sentarum and Bukit Baka 
Bukit raya national Parks. 
forests in this district have been subject to exploitation since the late 1960s, 
primarily by concession holders. of the 2.1 million ha of forested area in sintang 
district, 1.4 million ha (65%) of production forest are allocated to 17 concession 
holders (dinas kehutanan kalimantan Barat 2004). large-scale forest concession 
allocation continues to be decided by central government in Jakarta.
methodology
this was a qualitative study carried out from July 2002 to august 20036 , to 
taBle 2
hPhh 100-ha permits issued by district governments in West kalimantan
district Government Year total 
  permits
 2000 2001 2002 
 
kapuas hulu 11 165 159 335
sintang 102 176 186 464
sanggau 1 7 12 20
sambas 4 13 7 24
Bengkayang 0 4 9 13
landak 0 1 1 2
Pontianak 12 32 31 75
ketapang 1 1 9 11
total 131 399 414 944
4in 1999, cifor began the first round of research on the decentralization of forest administration 
and policies in four provinces: riau, east kalimantan, central kalimantan and West kalimantan. in 
conjunction with this study, cifor also conducted case studies in four other provinces, Jambi, east 
kalimantan, south sulawesi and West Papua, as part of the second round of research. 
5on 20 november 2003, as part of the decentralization process, sintang district was split into two: one 
district called sintang and other melawi. however, the new melawi district will not be fully operational 
until 2005 and in the meantime administrative responsibilities are carried out by the sintang district 
office.
6this study was conducted by cifor in collaboration with the university of tanjung Pura and Yayasan 
konservasi Borneo, West kalimantan, and Wageningen university, the netherlands.
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describe how forest management has changed under decentralization policies, 
using semi-structured interviews at the village, district, provincial and national 
levels. one of our research team observed ‘small logging permits’ in operation 
over an 8-month period and interacted intensively with local communities.
We collected and analyzed secondary data regarding new policies and 
regulations by interviewing government officials at district, provincial and 
national levels – in the ministry of forestry (mof) in Jakarta, and in local 
land-use planning bureaux and district and provincial forestry and tax offices. 
furthermore, we convened a multi-stakeholder district workshop in april 2004 
to present and discuss our findings. above all, we shared our findings in a 
national policy seminar, held in Bogor, West Java, in september 2004, which 
allowed us to obtain feedback and at the same time learn about decentralization 
work in other provinces.
the implementation of hphh concessions and their impacts 
on local economies
Because central government did not provide clear guidelines for the implementation 
of iuPhhk and hPhh permits, district governments used their own initiative to 
?
figure 1. research area
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regulate the operation of these new types of logging concessions. consequently, 
district governments issued district regulations in the form of head of district 
decrees. for example, the sintang district Government issued a new forest 
management regulation through decree no. 19/1999. 
the decree stipulated that concession areas should be located in conversion 
forests (i.e., forests that are to be converted to other uses such as agriculture, 
plantation etc.) or production forests as described in the Provincial spatial Plan 
(PsP) and consensus for forest land use (cflu). there was also a provision 
for the extraction of non-timber forest products in conversion forests, production 
forests, conservation forests and privately-owned forests. furthermore, the 
decree set conditions for fulfilling administrative requirements, evaluation 
methods etc. a further condition was that logging should not be carried out 
using heavy equipment; instead, the use of semi-mechanical equipment was 
strongly encouraged to ensure that the impacts of logging on forest and soil 
were minimized. above all, to ensure regeneration, permit holders had to replant 
using local species once a site was logged over.
the process for obtaining a hPhh permit normally comprised several major 
steps. first, the applicant submitted a proposal for a permit to the district head. 
second, the proposal was reviewed by the district head. if the applicant met all 
the requirements as indicated in the decree, the district head issued a ‘forest 
product harvesting rights permit’ that was valid for three months and only 
extendable subject to performance. during the 3-month period, the applicant 
– normally a cooperative or farmer group represented by its ‘coordinator’ – was 
obliged to map the forest area, carry out a survey of tree stands, determine the 
existence of third-party rights over the area, identify ‘partners’ for carrying out 
logging activities7 , pay a pre-felling tax to government and submit a work plan. 
if the district government approved the work plan, a 1-year logging permit was 
issued. however, the district head could revoke the permit unilaterally if the 
work plan was not submitted within the 3-month period or if it was considered 
inadequate.
the implementation of the permit on the ground was another story. most of 
the workforces were not aware of the guidelines for carrying out logging as laid 
down in decree no. 19/1999, and the district governments exercised little if any 
control. as a consequence, our team observed many practices that deviated from 
the provisions laid down in the decree, including:
• Boundary and forest surveys were not carried out properly, and area 
identification was simply done on paper. as a result there was a great deal 
of overlap among hPhh areas and between hPhh areas and forest company 
concession areas. 
• felling was almost always carried out using heavy equipment such as chainsaws, 
tractors and logging trucks. this happened because most cooperatives and 
7commonly, cooperative and farmer groups linked up with a party that had capital, equipment and 
technical knowledghe to carry out logging. Partners were often local entrepreneurs, exisiting logging 
companies or timber ‘brokers’ from malaysai.
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farmer groups partnered and sub-contracted their permits to large companies 
that were already in the area (e.g., existing concession holders). in return, the 
cooperatives or farmer groups received fees from the companies based on the 
number of trees logged in their respective hPhh location. 
• none of the permit holders in the district replanted their areas, although they 
were obliged to do so.
according to our respondents, the irregularities in the implementation of hPhh 
permits were mainly due to the inability of district governments to control the 
activities on ground. When consulted on this issue, district government officials 
claimed that they did not have sufficient personnel to carry out monitoring 
and evaluation nor did they have enough funding for such activities. as a 
consequence, most of the monitoring and evaluation was based on paperwork 
and reports provided by permit holders. 
despite the many irregularities in the implementation of hPhh permits, the 
advantages to the district governments were clear: they could collect taxes from 
permit holders. at least three types of tax were derived from hPhh, namely 
application fees, pre-felling taxes and forest rehabilitation taxes. By mid-2003, 
602 hPhh permits had been issued by sintang district Government. We 
estimated that sintang district’s total revenue from hPhh permits amounted to 
at least us$ 11 million (see table 3).
at the community level, the hPhh policy provided economic benefits, 
particularly to the cooperative and farmer groups that held permits. We calculated 
the economic return to a cooperative permit holder in nanga sayan village to 
be rp. 136 million, or about us$ 15,000. this was the net sum received after 
the deduction of all costs such as administration charges, taxes, coordinator’s 
fee, surveys etc. each cooperative member received around us$ 500 from this 
sum. 
cooperative members used the funds for new economic activities such as 
keeping small shops, operating sawmills and running nightclubs and hotels. 
clearly, at the community level the economic benefit of hPhh was relatively 
low compared to the local government’s tax gain. nevertheless, the new policy 
taBle 3
estimated revenue of sintang district from hPhh permits (from 2000–mid 2003)8
source of revenue number of hPhh permits cost per unit (us$) total (us$)
Permit applications 602  167 10,053
Pre-felling taxes  602 1067 64,233
forest rehabilitation taxes
(based on timber volume
harvested   11,110,000
total 11,184,286
8exchange rate: us$1 = (indonesian rupiah) rp. 9,000
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was a definite improvement for local communities because under the soeharto 
regime the local community had received nothing from forestry, as all logging 
had been carried out by large concession holders and all taxes had been paid to 
the central government in Jakarta.
on the other hand, our study also uncovered a degree of corruption involving 
coordinators from the communities who played a major role in fulfilling the 
administrative requirements for acquiring permits from district governments. 
in many cases the coordinators could not account for all expenses with proper 
receipts: for instance, when they had to pay fees at the district office to have 
their application processed. the interviews with most of the applicants indicated 
that this lack of control was common. therefore conflicts between community 
members and their coordinators were not uncommon.
as can be seen, the issuing of hPhh permits in sintang increased the number 
of actors and activities in the forestry sector; the same is also true for other parts 
of indonesia (see e.g., Barr, et al. 2001, mccarthy, 2001, resosudarmo, 2004). 
one of the major problems with the coexistence of the various permit holders 
and inadequate boundary surveys was overlapping claims to forest areas. for 
example, we found at least one concession holder reporting that hPhh operators 
felled trees in an existing concession area. the hPhh operators based their 
activities on permission from the district head to log trees in that particular 
area. as a result, there were many conflicts and disputes on the ground with 
regard to boundaries and access to trees.
these various conflicts were made known to the central government. in 2002, 
on the grounds that the implementation of small concessions was considered to 
escalate conflicts (i.e., among permit holders and between permit holders and 
existing concession holders) and illegal logging activities (schroeder-Wildberg 
and carius, 2003), the mof revoked the legislation that allowed district 
governments to issue small logging permits9 , a decision that became effective on 
1 march 2003. to strengthen its argument, central government further claimed 
that district governments lacked the capacity to implement and supervise permit 
holders adequately so that most of the permit holders failed to achieve sustainable 
forest management (sfm) criteria and standards. 
nonetheless, district governments in West kalimantan continued to issue 
permits well beyond the cut-off date. according to the sintang district head, 
the revocation did not comply with the higher legislation on decentralization and 
failed to support the interests of local forest stakeholders. after several warnings 
from the central government at the end of 2003, most district governments in 
West kalimantan stopped issuing permits. 
multi-level stakeholder conflicts in decentralized forest management
Before the authority to issue logging permits was taken away from district 
9decree of ministry of forestry no. 541/2002, Government regulation no. 34/2002 and ministerial 
decree no. 6886/2002.
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heads, interaction between local and central government appeared to function 
with minimal conflict. the district Government in sintang stated that it was 
happy to be able to participate in forest management in its district because, 
during the soeharto era, it had not been able to do so as everything had been 
controlled by central government in Jakarta. moreover, through the issuing of 
logging permits at district level, district governments generated significant local 
revenues. however, after the revocation of the district governments’ authority to 
issue logging permits, sintang district Government began to accuse the central 
government of being unwilling to decentralize authority over forest management: 
sintang claimed that central government in Jakarta wanted to re-centralize forest 
management. at this point, the district Government argued that re-centralization 
of forest management was not in line with decentralization policies as laid down 
in laws 22 and 25.
however, a high ranking official of the mof stated in an interview that the 
mof had never intended to fully decentralize authority over forest management. 
the official said “[…] we are not re-centralizing forest management because 
from the beginning the central government has never given full authority to local 
governments to issue logging permits. the government regulation and ministry 
decrees stated that the central government might give part of its authority to local 
governments gradually as long as local governments are considered institutionally 
ready”. according to the official, many local governments had misinterpreted 
the regulations and acted on their own initiative. clearly, central and local 
governments differed in their interpretation of government regulations. 
a second type of conflict was conflict among stakeholders who participated 
in the small logging activities. implementation of the hPhh ‘100-ha concession’ 
resulted in at least four forms of commonly observed horizontal conflict, 
namely:
• Conflicts between cooperatives or farmer group members and their coordinators 
about the use of funds and the distribution of money. coordinators, with their 
larger roles, would automatically receive the greater share. in many cases 
irregularities occurred when coordinators used the group’s money for their 
own purposes or did not report money that they had received from private 
partners.
• Conflict over customary forests. this type of conflict arose when hPhh ‘100-
ha’ concessions were issued for forest over which two neighbouring villages 
held customary claims. this occurred when the village borders were unclear 
and forest survey teams had not made proper surveys in the field (conflict 
between Bora and mekar Pelita villages, for example)
• Conflict between cooperatives or farmer groups and their partners such 
as logging investors or large-concession holders (e.g., conflict between a 
cooperative in nanga sayan village with its partner, an existing concession 
holder). these conflicts revolved around farmer groups protesting when 
the partner did not adhere to agreed schedules or changed block-felling 
timetables. in some cases partners failed to keep promises to pay previously 
agreed amounts of fees to the cooperative.
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• Conflict among members of a particular farmer group/cooperative occurred 
when those having proof of customary rights over forest, making use of tax 
receipts from the dutch colonial era, claimed higher benefits/fees from hPhh, 
while others, who did not have such proof, received only smaller benefits (a 
farmer group/cooperative in nanga sayan, for example).
diScuSSion and leSSonS learnt
this case study has shown that the shift of forest management from centralized 
towards decentralized management brought with it some economic benefits to 
local stakeholders such as district governments, local communities and timber-
industry entrepreneurs. for the first time local governments gained the local 
taxes from timber activities; similarly, local communities appreciated that they 
could receive direct benefits from the implementation of decentralized forest 
management. at the local level, some new economic activities also grew as a 
consequence of new forestry-related activities in their area. 
although the indication of positive economic benefits at local level was 
applauded by many local stakeholders, decentralized forest management also 
introduced several major problems. the problems included conflicts between 
local and central government due to differences in their interpretation of 
decentralization regulations and the revocation by central government of the 
local governments’ authority to issue logging permits; horizontal conflicts among 
stakeholders involved in forestry activities (e.g., among permit holders, between 
permit holders and existing concessionaires); and internal conflict among the 
members of a particular farmer group or cooperative over the distribution of fees 
from logging activities.
as in many other nrm conflicts (see e.g., matose, 1997, fao 2000, 
hellstrom, 2001, Wulan et al., 2004), the conflicts in West kalimantan had a 
variety of consequences. conflict between local and central government often 
resulted in lack of trust between them. this lack of trust was reflected in the 
accusation by local governments that central government wanted to re-centralize 
forest management. moreover, central government was often ‘attacked’ for its 
unwillingness to share power. despite these accusations, the powerful central 
government upheld its decision to revoke the authority of local governments 
to issue logging permits. as a result, the local government in sintang delayed 
complying with the central government’s decision, in protest. this situation 
clearly indicates a continuing power struggle between central and local 
government regarding forest decentralization. on the other hand, under the 
decentralized system horizontal conflicts among stakeholders who participated 
in forest management under the new policies also appeared to be common. 
disagreements over boundaries, disputes over work plans and benefit sharing, 
accusation of corruption and illegal logging activities were often reported. 
from our observation, the outcomes of the various conflicts have been rather 
negative. furthermore, the inability of government to control forest activities has 
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resulted in widespread illegal logging (schroeder-Wildberg and carius, 2003). 
although there was no report of hostility, all the conflicts were indications 
of a dysfunctional system. for this reason, we agree with the argument put 
forward earlier by many ‘functionalists’ who described conflict as a mess, bad 
and a hindrance (Bailey, 1997). in the West kalimantan case, these negative 
consequences of conflict had considerable impact.
nevertheless, the negative consequences indicated above could be explained 
by the inability of the stakeholders involved to cope with and address the 
conflicts appropriately. the need for conflict management in the implementation 
of decentralized forest management had not been taken into account in any 
of the legislation. We failed to find any clause in the government or district 
legislation that explicitly regulates how stakeholder conflicts should be addressed. 
consequently, it is not surprising that these conflicts had negative impacts.
the most important next step for addressing conflicts in decentralized forest 
management in West kalimantan is to develop mechanisms and capabilities to 
address conflict at different levels (village, district and national) in order to 
implement desirable changes (Walker and daniels, 1997, kriesberg 1998, castro 
and nielson 2001). an initiative to establish good two-way communication 
between local and central government over the implementation of decentralized 
forest management is needed. this communication should form the foundation 
for a shared understanding of the different regulations and how those regulations 
should be implemented. most importantly, this communication should find 
options for local and central governments to carry out forest management 
jointly and describe their respective roles and responsibilities in such a joint 
forest management arrangement. in decentralized forest management clear 
understanding of the roles and responsibilities of the different government levels 
is essential. castro and neilson (2001) have indicated that collaborative forest 
management initiatives between different levels of government organizations and 
among various stakeholders often result from bitter conflicts. 
Glasl (1999) argued that the success of conflict management relies heavily 
on the ability to address its triggers. We suggest that there is a need to develop 
negotiation skills. negotiation, which has not been used in any of these conflicts, 
seems to be lacking at the moment. Power intervention was clearly dominant, as 
indicated by the revocation by central government of the district governments’ 
authority. ideally, there should have been negotiation between the parties 
to find a ‘win-win solution’ rather than a quick and seemingly unacceptable 
use of power. furthermore, at the local level negotiation might be beneficial. 
local communities need to improve their skills in negotiation in order to deal 
successfully with outsiders such as timber companies. local non-government 
and research organizations should have a crucial role by providing such training. 
finally, conflicts must be anticipated (castro and nielson, 2003). Policies must 
include carefully devised conflict management schemes as an integral part of 
resource management. furthermore, there is a need to develop awareness amongst 
all stakeholders that conflict is almost unavoidable. once they are aware of this, 
stakeholders should be able to anticipate conflict and therefore strive to develop 
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their own ability to address it accordingly. the stakeholders themselves must 
learn how they can best handle their conflicts (Glasl, 1999), and how to obtain 
outside help (e.g., mediators, facilitators etc.) if they are no longer able to cope 
with conflicts by themselves.
concluSionS
the implementation of forest decentralization policies in West kalimantan 
resulted in conflicts between local and central government about the authority to 
issue logging permits. furthermore, forest decentralization policies also created 
local conflicts among stakeholders over boundaries, benefit sharing etc. no 
systematic conflict management mechanisms have been used to address these 
conflicts. as a consequence, many of the conflicts resulted in negative impacts 
such as lack of trust, illegal logging, accusations etc. nevertheless, it has been 
argued that there is the potential to manage conflicts through the development 
of communication and negotiation skills. conflict in resource management 
must be anticipated from the outset so that when it arises it can be addressed 
adequately.
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